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1. Introduction. 
Empirical studies of the links between competition and productivity face two difficult 
problems: how to measure the intensity of competition and how to unravel the complex 
links between competition and productivity, two variables which may simultaneously 
affect one another. A common approach, which involves using measures of market 
structure or profitability as proxies for the intensity of competition, is often problematic, 
since these variables are endogenous with respect to competition. More recently, some 
authors have tried to by-pass these problems by focusing on exogenous institutional 
determinants of competition, such as regulatory reform or trade liberalisation policies 
(Bottasso and Sembenelli 2001, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003, Schmitz 2005). However, 
almost none of these studies have examined the links between competition and 
productivity for different groups of firms across industries. An exception is Fernandes 
(2007) who has shown that the positive impact of trade liberalisation on productivity in 
Colombia was stronger for larger plants than for smaller ones. On the other hand, Dutz 
(1996) has found that smaller firms were more likely than larger ones to exit their 
industries as a result of liberalisation in Morocco. Thus the relation between competition 
and the productivity differential between larger and smaller firms is very much an open 
question. 
In a recent study of the effects of competition on productivity I examined 
evidence from a unique natural experiment of policy reform. Using data on the British 
price-fixing cartels of the 1950s both before and after their abolition, as well as data on a 
control group of competitive industries over the same time period, I showed that the 
cartels significantly slowed down industry productivity growth in the 1950s (Symeonidis 
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2008).1 Since the evidence also suggests that the cartels induced excessive entry of firms 
into the collusive industries but did not raise firms’ profits (Symeonidis 2000a, 2000b, 
2002), it appears that the survival of inefficient firms may have been the most important 
source of welfare loss from collusion in the UK. Other studies have found a significant 
positive effect of competitive pressure caused by deregulation or foreign competition on 
productivity (Bottasso and Sembenelli 2001, Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003, Schmitz 
2005). If, as seems to be the case, the dynamic inefficiency caused by the lack of 
competition is a significant source of welfare loss, it is important to understand the 
economic mechanisms and firm characteristics that generate this inefficiency. 
In this paper I examine one aspect of the productivity performance of the British 
cartels in more detail. In particular, I focus on productivity differences between larger and 
smaller firms and I attempt to address the following question: which firms were mainly 
responsible for the slowdown in productivity growth in collusive relative to competitive 
industries?2 This question cannot be answered by examining only collusive industries, 
since productivity differences across firms in any industry are driven by a variety of 
factors. In what follows, I compare collusive to competitive industries and I find evidence 
of a negative relationship between collusion and the labour productivity of larger firms 
relative to smaller ones in 1950s Britain. In particular, the results suggest that collusion is 
associated with a reduction or even a reversal of the productivity gap between larger and 
                                                 
1 An earlier study of the links between collusion and productivity in the UK, using cross-
section data before the abolition of the cartels, is Broadberry and Crafts (1996). 
2 The answer to this question is unlikely to be “the very small and inefficient firms that 
survived under the cartel umbrella” since these firms did not affect the aggregate industry 
productivity very much. 
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smaller firms. These results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of 
collusion. 
I should point out that it is not possible to examine the link between collusion and 
relative productivity over time because panel data on relative productivity are not 
available. The present analysis, which is based on cross-section data for the early 1950s, 
may still provide significant insight into the factors that explain the low productivity 
performance of British collusive industries relative to competitive industries during the 
1950s. In particular, the negative relationship between collusion and the labour 
productivity of larger firms relative to smaller ones suggests that the low productivity of 
larger firms was probably one of the factors behind the slow productivity growth of 
collusive industries relative to competitive industries. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first statistical study of the relationship 
between collusion and the relative productivity of firms,3 and one of very few studies that 
examine, more generally, the links between competition and the relative performance of 
firms. In fact, there is very little empirical evidence on industry-level determinants of the 
relative productivity of large and small firms. Caves and Barton (1990) have focused on 
the technical efficiency of firms, and much of their discussion does not apply directly to 
labour productivity. Most studies of the relative productivity of firms of different size 
either focus on simply identifying a relationship between size and productivity or 
examine how this relationship depends on (largely endogenous) factors that differ across 
firm size (see, for instance, Brush and Karnani 1996,  Idson and Oi 1999, Dhawan 2001). 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, there is a large empirical literature on the effects of cartels on prices 
(see Levenstein and Suslow 2006, Connor and Bolotova 2006 for recent surveys). 
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In contrast, my focus is on exogenous industry characteristics, including the intensity of 
competition. 
 
2. The data. 
Explicit price-fixing agreements between firms were operating in about half of British 
manufacturing industries in the 1950s. Some dated from the 1880s and 1890s, many 
others had been stimulated by government policies for the control of industry during 
the two world wars, and still others were the result of the depression of the inter-war 
years (Swann et al. 1974). Concern over the extent of cartelisation in the 1940s led to 
the introduction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act in 1948, giving 
powers to the newly created Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission to 
investigate cartels on a case by case basis. Although the Act provided for remedies if 
it was thought necessary, the procedure was slow, the recommendations of the 
Commission mixed and government action ambiguous. As a result, the 1948 Act did 
not have a significant impact on competition in British industry (Swann et al. 1974). 
The agreements were not enforceable at law, but they were not illegal. Case-
study evidence suggests that most of them were effective, the parties accounted for a 
large fraction of the relevant market, and there were a number of factors that limited 
outside competition – although entry to the industry was usually not restricted (Swann et 
al. 1973, 1974; Symeonidis 2002, 2003).4 
                                                 
4 The effectiveness of outside competition was limited in many industries because the 
cartels tended to contain most or all of the largest and best-known domestic firms; 
because practices intended to limit outside competition, such as aggregated rebates and 
collective exclusive dealing, were common; and because competition from imports was 
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In this paper I use data from the early 1950s, a period when the cartels were still 
in place. The most comprehensive source of data on collusion in UK manufacturing in the 
1950s is the Register of Restrictive Trading Agreements created under the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The 1956 Act required the registration of restrictive 
agreements, including verbal or even implied arrangements, on goods. Registered 
agreements should be abandoned, unless they were successfully defended by the parties 
in the newly created Restrictive Practices Court as producing benefits that outweighed the 
presumed detriment or unless they were cleared by the Registrar of Restrictive Trading 
Agreements as not significantly affecting competition. Because the attitude of the Court 
could not be known until the first cases had been heard, the large majority of industries 
registered their agreements rather than dropping or secretly continuing them. 
While my main source of data on competition are the agreements registered under 
the 1956 Act, the large majority, if not all, of these had been in force for a long time, and 
were certainly effective in the early 1950s.5 Furthermore, I also use other sources to 
identify unregistered agreements or agreements modified before registration, including 
the various reports of the Monopolies Commission, the 1955 Monopolies Commission 
report on collective discrimination, the 1949 report of the Lloyds’ Committee on resale 
price maintenance, industry studies contained in Burn (1958) and Hart et al. (1973), the 
                                                                                                                                                 
often limited as a result of tariffs and quantitative controls, differing technical standards, 
transport costs or international restrictive agreements. 
5 Since comprehensive collusion data for the 1940s are not available, one cannot rule out 
the possibility that a few of the cartels became effective after 1951. This would, if 
anything, tend to bias toward zero the estimated coefficient of collusion on relative 
productivity in the OLS regressions of section 3. 
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Board of Trade annual reports from 1950 to 1956, and the Political and Economic 
Planning (1957) survey of trade associations (including unpublished background material 
for this survey). The use of a diverse range of sources is one reason why any potential 
measurement error caused by ineffective agreements or unknown cases of collusion in the 
dataset is likely to be very small. A detailed discussion of this issue is provided in the 
Appendix.  
Although the "degree of collusion" must have varied across cartelised industries – 
depending on the type of restrictions, the extent of outside competition, the balance of 
interests within the cartel, and so on – it is possible to split the UK manufacturing sector 
in the 1950s into a group of collusive industries and a group of industries without 
restrictive agreements. Going beyond this – for instance, by classifying industries with 
respect to the "degree of collusion" – is very difficult, given the information available. 
Still, the binary classification adopted here is sufficient for analysing the links between 
collusion and the relative productivity of large and small firms in 1950s Britain. Note 
that, in any case, the two-stage econometric models that will be used in this paper will 
address concerns of measurement error caused by ineffective agreements, unknown cases 
of collusion or differences in the degree of collusion across collusive industries. 
Manufacturing industries were classified according to their state of competition 
on the basis of three criteria: the reliability of the data source, the types of restrictions, 
and the proportion of an industry's total sales covered by cartel firms. In particular, the 
various types of restrictions were classified as significant, not significant or uncertain, 
according to their likely impact on competition. Next, the products that were subject to 
agreements were assigned to the industry categories used. Since the data on productivity 
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and other variables are available at the four-digit industry level, several industries consist 
of subdivisions with different competitive regimes. An industry was classified as 
collusive if the products subject to significant restrictions accounted for more than 80% 
of total industry sales.6 It was classified as competitive if the products subject to 
significant or uncertain restrictions accounted for less than 20% of industry sales. And it 
was classified as ambiguous in all remaining cases. I have used the 20% cut-off point 
because in some cases secondary industry products were subject to restrictive 
agreements, although core industry products were not. I have also used the 80% cut-off 
point because in some cases most core industry products were subject to price-fixing, 
although some or some secondary products were not. Small variations in the cut-off 
points (in particular using 10% instead of 20%, or using 50% instead of 80%) do not 
significantly affect the results, as will be shown below. Industries with ambiguous state of 
competition were then excluded from the sample and the dummy variable COLL was 
defined: this takes the value 1 for industries that were collusive in the 1950s and 0 for 
industries which were competitive. 
Note that the use of a continuous competition measure, such as the fraction of 
sales revenue covered by products subject to agreements, instead of cut-off points has 
proved impractical. First, the link between the fraction of sales revenue covered by 
products with agreements and the state of competition is blurred by a variety of factors, 
                                                 
6 The proportion of an industry's total sales subject to significant restrictions is for 1951, 
the same year as the productivity data. This proportion may change over time but rarely is 
this change so large during the 1950s as to cause an industry to move above or below the 
relevant cut-off point (and even then, it won’t move much above or below). Furthermore, 
the results are robust to using different cut-off points, as will be shown below. 
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including the types of restrictions, the extent of outside competition, and so on. Second, it 
is often the case that some products within an industry were subject to significant 
restrictions, while other products were subject to uncertain restrictions. It is not clear how 
to deal with such cases if one wants to construct a continuous measure of competition. 
Third, some industries consist of subdivisions with very different market structures, and, 
although some of these subdivisions were collusive, most were not. The use of cut-off 
points has the advantage of treating such industries for what they really are, namely 
ambiguous, rather than trying to fit them into a continuum of states of competition. 
The dataset is a cross-section of 187 four-digit manufacturing industries, 87 of 
which were collusive.7 Information is available on a number of industry variables, the 
most important of which for my present purposes are the aggregate gross output, net 
output and employment of the three largest firms (in terms of the number of employees) 
in each industry. This information is only available for 1951 and reported, along with 
three-firm concentration ratios, in Evely and Little (1960). Thus my dependent variable in 
the next section is RELPROD, defined as the aggregate labour productivity of the three 
largest firms divided by the aggregate labour productivity of all the other firms in each 
industry (excluding, due to lack of data, very small plants employing less than 11 persons 
– these typically account for a very small fraction of industry output and employment). 
There are two reasons why I have chosen to focus on labour productivity rather 
than total factor productivity in this paper. First, the data on capital stock are estimates 
rather than primary data, and may therefore be subject to measurement error. Even 
                                                 
7 The sample excludes industries with significant government participation and includes 
two non-manufacturing industries – these do not significantly affect the results. 
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though capital intensity is included as a regressor in some of the models estimated below, 
the use of labour productivity rather than total factor productivity as dependent variable 
implies that at least there will be no measurement error in the dependent variable. 
Second, constructing estimates of total factor productivity always involves making rather 
restrictive assumptions about the production function, and these assumptions are not 
innocuous. 
The results of the present paper are based on a single measure of the relative 
productivity of larger to smaller firms. Note that the definition of “larger” and “smaller” 
is relative in the sense that it is based on a comparison of firms within each industry 
rather than a given level of firm size. I believe this is an advantage since it facilitates a 
focus on competitive interactions between firms as opposed to technological determinants 
of productivity. Using an absolute level of firm size would be impractical anyway 
because of the large variation in average firm size across industries. The split between the 
three largest firms and the rest is the only one for which there are available data. 
However, the split is not a very asymmetric one. The average value of the 1951 three-
firm concentration ratio is 0.41, and in exactly one third of all industries in the sample the 
three largest firms account for more than half of industry output. Thus, the performance 
of the three largest firms is usually an important determinant of the aggregate 
performance of large firms under any definition of the word “large”. Furthermore, the 
average number of firms in an industry in the sample is 125, and hence smaller firms 
have, on average, much lower market shares than the three larger firms: most of them are 
indeed “small”. On the other hand, since the large firms in the dataset have an average 
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market share of 14% in their industry, they are not unusually large and their performance 
does not reflect any characteristics specific to such firms.  
 
3. Econometric model and results. 
To study the links between collusion and relative productivity, I estimate regressions for 
RELPROD, the aggregate labour productivity of the three largest firms divided by the 
aggregate labour productivity of smaller firms in each industry. In principle, an 
alternative approach would be to run separate regressions for the labour productivity of 
larger and smaller firms. The problem with that approach is that a whole range of 
industry characteristics which have no effect on the relative productivity of firms within 
an industry do have an effect on productivity levels of large and small firms. Not only 
would this make omitted variable bias more likely, but it would also make it much more 
difficult to find valid and strong instruments for COLL in two-stage least-squares 
regressions. 
Labour productivity is defined in two different ways: as gross yearly output 
divided by the average number of employees during the year (this definition is used to 
construct RELPROD1) and as net output divided by the average number of employees 
(this definition is used to construct RELPROD2).8 The mean value of RELPROD1 
(RELPROD2) for all the competitive industries is 1.12 (1.09), while its mean value for 
the collusive industries is 1.07 (1.07). Thus, while larger firms were on average more 
productive than smaller ones in both groups of industries, the productivity gap was 
                                                 
8 Gross output is defined as the total value of sales and work done during the year 
adjusted for changes in the value of stocks. Net output is gross output minus: the cost of 
materials and fuel, payments for work given out and transport payments. 
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slightly narrower in the presence of collusion. However, this direct comparison may be 
misleading to the extent that the incidence of collusion is correlated with other variables 
that affect the productivity gap between large and small firms. Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics for all the variables separately for the two groups of industries. 
Collusive industries were, on average, more concentrated, more capital-intensive, less 
advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive, more likely to sell producer goods and better 
protected from foreign competition than competitive industries. 
 Economic theory provides little guidance regarding the industry characteristics 
that determine RELPROD other than the prediction that it will be higher in the presence 
of economies of scale or scope. The idea is that larger firms will be able to exploit such 
economies much more than smaller firms. So the more significant the scale and scope 
economies to be exploited in an industry, the wider the productivity gap between large 
and small firms. Moreover, as pointed out in the Introduction, there is very little empirical 
work on industry-level determinants of the relative productivity of large and small firms. 
I will therefore begin with a parsimonious specification: 
iiiii udummiesSectorCONCCOLLRELPROD ++++= 21 ββα ,  (1) 
where COLL was defined in the previous section and CONC is the 1951 three-firm 
concentration ratio. CONC is expected to have a positive effect on RELPROD to the 
extent that a concentrated market structure reflects the presence of significant economies 
of scale and scope.9 A potential complication is that the concentration ratio could perhaps 
                                                 
9 The correlation coefficient between CONC and COLL is a modest 0.17. I also 
experimented with other available measures of market structure, such as the average size 
of the largest firms divided by the average size of the smaller firms or the total number of 
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also be regarded as a measure of market power. I will return to this issue when discussing 
the results below. The inclusion of sector dummies among the regressors serves as a 
control for the presence of industry effects.10 
An objection to the above specification is the potential endogeneity of both 
CONC and COLL. With respect to CONC, it can be argued that market structure is itself a 
function of the competitive regime. Also, CONC may be influenced by the relative 
productivity of firms if more efficient firms have larger market shares. With respect to 
COLL, a possible objection is that any difference in RELPROD between collusive and 
competitive industries may be to some extent due to unobserved characteristics that differ 
between the two groups rather than the state of competition. Moreover, the direction of 
causality could be the opposite of what is assumed here. To address these concerns I will 
also estimate (1) using a two-stage least-squares model where both CONC and COLL are 
treated as endogenous. An additional important advantage of the two-stage estimates is 
that they are not affected by any measurement error in COLL due to unidentified or 
ineffective collusive agreements or cases of tacit collusion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
firms, but these were not statistically significant. It is not surprising that CONC performs 
better: unlike the other two variables, it is not affected by the number or the size of very 
small firms in an industry. A measure of minimum efficient scale based on the median 
plant size would be a better measure of scale economies but could not be constructed 
because of data limitations. 
10 Ten sectors are distinguished: food and drink; coal products and chemicals; basic 
metals; mechanical engineering and vehicles; instruments and electrical engineering; 
metal products; textiles, leather and clothing; building materials, pottery, glass and wood 
products; paper products; and other manufacturing (the benchmark in equation (1)). 
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For the two-stage regressions the instruments include lnGROUT, ln(K/L), ADV, 
RD, PRODCON, UNION and FOREIGN.11 All of these variables potentially affect 
CONC, COLL or both. In particular, GROUT is industry gross product, as reported in the 
1951 Census of Production, and serves as a measure of market size, an important 
determinant of concentration. K/L is the capital-labour ratio, another important 
determinant of concentration as well as collusion in 1950s Britain (Symeonidis 2002, 
2003).12 ADV and RD are dummy variables which are equal to 0 for industries with 
advertising-sales ratio and R&D-sales ratio, respectively, lower than 1% and equal to 1 
otherwise. These variables are intended to capture the effect of advertising effectiveness 
and technological opportunity on the likelihood of collusion: both had a negative effect 
on the incidence of collusion among British firms in the 1950s.13 PRODCON takes the 
                                                 
11 Note that although several of these variables may directly affect labour productivity, 
there is no reason to expect that they might affect relative labour productivity. I check 
this below both by reporting the results of overidentification tests for the two-stage least-
squares regressions and by running OLS regressions of RELPROD with the entire set of 
instruments used as regressors. Either way, there is no evidence of any direct effect of the 
instruments on RELPROD. 
12 The data on capital stock are estimates at the three-digit level of aggregation rather than 
primary data and were taken from O'Mahoney and Oulton (1990). They were not 
available for 1951, so 1954 estimates were used instead and combined with employment 
data from the 1954 Census of Production. 
13 While the advertising-sales ratio and the R&D-sales ratio are endogenous, it is 
generally exogenous industry characteristics that will determine whether these ratios are 
above or below 1% (or 2%). Thus, in an industry below the 1% cut-off point, advertising 
is not very effective in raising consumers’ willingness to pay or there is little scope for 
technological innovation from within the industry. On the other hand, in an industry 
above the 1% cut-off point, advertising/R&D “works”. Of course, whether such an 
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value 0 for producer goods industries and 1 for consumer goods industries; the former 
were more likely to be cartelized than the latter in 1950s Britain. UNION is union density, 
measured at a level of aggregation between the two-digit and the three-digit industry level 
and obtained from Bain and Price (1980). Finally, FOREIGN is a dummy variable which 
takes the value 0 for industries with relatively high protection in the mid-1950s and the 
value 1 for industries with relatively low protection and is negatively correlated with 
COLL (Symeonidis 2003).14 
To check the robustness and validity of the results I will also estimate with OLS a 
model that includes the above variables as additional regressors: 
.
)/ln(ln
9876
54321
iiiii
iiiiiii
udummiesSectorFOREIGNUNIONPRODCONRD
ADVLKGROUTCONCCOLLRELPROD
++++++
+++++=
ββββ
βββββα
 (2) 
Table 2 contains the main results.15 The gap in labour productivity between the 
three largest and all the other firms in each industry is considerably narrower in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
industry has an advertising-sales ratio or R&D-sales ratio of 5% or 10%, say, may be 
largely determined endogenously. But my binary variables ADV and RD are not very 
sensitive to endogenous factors that affect advertising and R&D intensity. The procedure 
for constructing RD and ADV involved combining information from various official and 
market research sources; see Symeonidis (2003) for details and a list of the sources used. 
14 The group of industries with high protection contains the engineering industries, 
instruments, vehicles, finished metal goods, some chemicals, paper and paper products, 
furniture, pottery and glass, most finished textile goods, rubber products, and various 
other finished manufactures. The low-protection group contains most food and drink 
industries, some chemicals, basic metals, clothing and footwear, wood products, 
publishing, leather and most textile semi-manufactures, and building materials. 
15 The difference in n between the various columns of Table 2 (or Table 4) is due to 
missing data for some of the additional variables used. 
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presence of collusion and may also be reversed in certain sectors: RELPROD is 15% 
lower in the presence of collusion in the OLS regressions and 30% lower in the 2SLS 
regressions and this effect is statistically significant in all models except the OLS 
regressions with RELPROD2. Note that several tests suggest that the instruments are 
valid and strong. Thus the coefficients on lnGROUT and ln(K/L) are statistically 
significant at the 1% level in the first-stage regression for CONC, those on ln(K/L) and 
FOREIGN are statistically significant at the 5% level in the first-stage regression for 
COLL. First-stage results are shown in Table 3. Moreover, Shea’s partial R2 in the first-
stage regression is 0.21 for CONC and 0.16 for COLL. Finally, the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity in 
any of the regressions. 
While the coefficients on COLL in the two-stage regressions are large and should 
perhaps be treated with some caution, they suggest that there is a strong negative and 
statistically significant effect of collusion on relative labour productivity. The coefficients 
on the sector dummies (not reported) are everywhere jointly significant at the 5% level. 
CONC has a positive effect on RELPROD, as expected for a measure of scale and scope 
economies.16 On the other hand, if CONC were to be regarded as a measure of market 
power, its positive coefficient would be more difficult to interpret. In any case, the 
positive link between CONC and RELPROD does not contradict the negative association 
                                                 
16 When either CONC or the sector dummies are omitted, the coefficient on COLL is still 
everywhere negative but smaller (and statistically significant at the 10% level at best). 
This is not surprising: both CONC and the sector dummies are correlated with COLL as 
well as having a direct effect on RELPROD, so their omission causes a bias in the 
estimated coefficient on COLL. 
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between COLL and RELPROD. Of the two variables, COLL is a clear measure of 
collusive conduct, while CONC is only indirectly and ambiguously associated with the 
intensity of competition.17 None of the other variables has any effect on RELPROD. 
I also performed a variety of further robustness tests. Some of these are presented 
in Table 4, where the dependent variable throughout is RELPROD1. First, I used 
somewhat modified criteria for classifying industries as collusive or competitive. For 
instance, the first three columns of Table 4 report results using COLL2 as the collusion 
variable. To construct COLL2, an industry was classified as collusive if the products 
subject to significant restrictions accounted for more than 50% of total industry sales and 
it was classified as competitive if the products subject to significant or uncertain 
restrictions accounted for less than 10% of industry sales. This resulted in 98 industries 
being defined as collusive and 84 as competitive (with COLL, the numbers were 87 and 
100, respectively). Second, I used the 2% instead of the 1% cut-off point for the 
advertising-sales ratio and the R&D-sales ratio to construct dummies for advertising 
effectiveness and technological opportunity (ADV2 and RD2). Third, I replaced the three-
digit capital-labour ratio with estimates of K/L at the four-digit industry level, derived by 
multiplying three-digit capital stock by the ratio of four-digit investment to three-digit 
investment and dividing this by four-digit employment. The fourth and fifth columns of 
Table 3 contain results when ADV, RD and the 3-digit K/L are replaced by ADV2, RD2 
and the 4-digit K/L, respectively. In all cases, the results were not much affected. I also 
                                                 
17 The abolition of cartels and the resulting intensification of competition caused 
concentration to rise in previously collusive industries. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence of concentration facilitating collusion after controlling for capital intensity 
(Symeonidis 2002, 2003). 
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estimated two-stage models with only CONC or COLL treated as endogenous, and again 
the results were robust.  
 
4. Concluding remarks. 
While previous studies have found that the lack of competition, and collusion in 
particular, slow down productivity growth, little is known on the economic mechanisms 
and firm characteristics that drive this effect. This paper takes a step towards answering 
this question, by focusing on the links between collusion and the relative productivity of 
larger and smaller firms. Since I can only observe cross-section data in this paper, 
unravelling the links between competition and relative productivity relies on the use of 
instrumental variable analysis that takes into account the potential endogeneity of 
collusion. 
The results from the analysis of a comprehensive dataset on the incidence of 
price-fixing across British manufacturing industries in the 1950s reveal a negative 
association between collusion and the labour productivity of the largest relative to the 
smaller firms, which persists when controlling for the potential endogeneity of collusion. 
This is consistent with the view that the productivity slowdown in collusive relative to 
competitive industries that was documented in Symeonidis (2008) was driven to some 
extent by the relatively poor performance of the largest firms in collusive industries. It is 
interesting that even though the cartels induced excessive entry of firms into the collusive 
industries, the productivity slowdown was probably not primarily caused by the entry of 
too many small inefficient firms. 
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The results of this paper are based on cross-section data and the relative 
productivity data are for 1951, while the productivity slowdown in collusive relative to 
competitive industries documented in Symeonidis (2008) refers to the period after 1951 
(for reasons of data availability). However, it seems likely that the underperformance of 
the larger firms in collusive industries is related to the relatively slow productivity growth 
of collusive industries. While plausible, this is not the only interpretation of the evidence, 
and it is also possible that the negative effect of collusion on productivity growth after 
1951 was an industry-wide effect which was independent of the underperformance of 
larger firms in collusive industries in the early 1950s. 
One possible reason for the negative association between collusion and the labour 
productivity of the largest relative to the smaller firms is that larger firms may be more 
likely than smaller ones to see their costs rise when competition is not intense. For 
instance, it is well known that unionisation is more pronounced in larger firms than in 
smaller ones and that unions are more likely to engage in restrictive practices when 
competition is not strong. Also, larger firms may face more inelastic demand, so they 
may be more willing to pass on costs to prices and less concerned about rising costs.  
Another reason may have to do with the internal organisation of many cartels, 
both in Britain and elsewhere, or, more generally, with the way prices are set by firms in 
collusive industries. If prices tend to be set by the leading firms or determined in 
negotiations between high-cost and low-cost producers, larger firms will usually be in a 
stronger position than smaller ones and may find it easier to pass on their costs to prices, 
so they will be less concerned about cost increases than smaller firms.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 Collusive 
(n = 87 ) 
Non-collusive 
(n = 100) 
 
RELPROD1 
 
1.07 (0.25) 
 
1.12 (0.47) 
 
RELPROD2 
 
1.07 (0.22) 
 
1.09 (0.38) 
 
CONC 
 
0.45 (0.22) 
 
0.37 (0.26) 
 
Ln(GROUT) 
 
10.20 (1.12) 
 
10.05 (1.13) 
 
Ln(K/L) 
 
1.03 (0.61) 
 
0.54 (0.84) 
 
ADV 
 
0.08 (0.27) 
 
0.26 (0.44) 
 
RD 
 
0.13 (0.33) 
 
0.20 (0.40) 
 
PRODCON 
 
0.24 (0.39) 
 
0.59 (0.47) 
 
UNION 
 
48.5 (12.3) 
 
43.9 (12.5) 
 
FOREIGN 
 
0.31 (0.46) 
 
0.52 (0.50) 
 
Note: The figures are means of the variables for collusive and non-collusive industries, 
respectively (with standard deviations in parentheses). n indicates the number of industries. 
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Table 2. Regression results for the determinants of RELPROD. 
 
 Dependent variable: RELPROD1  Dependent variable: RELPROD2 
 OLS OLS 2SLS  OLS OLS 2SLS 
COLL 
 
−0.16 
(−2.61) 
−0.14 
(−2.04) 
−0.27 
(−2.16) 
 −0.11 
(−1.72) 
−0.08 
(−1.37) 
−0.30 
(−2.10) 
CONC 
 
0.61 
(4.76) 
0.67 
(4.11) 
0.48 
(1.45) 
 0.52 
(4.50) 
0.50 
(4.32) 
0.68 
(2.35) 
lnGROUT 
 
- 0.02 
(1.00) 
-  - 0.02 
(1.01) 
- 
ln(K/L) 
 
- −0.04 
(−0.63) 
-  - 0.03 
(0.78) 
- 
ADV 
 
- 0.03 
(0.35) 
-  - 0.04 
(0.60) 
- 
RD 
 
- 0.04 
(0.42) 
-  - 0.10 
(0.80) 
- 
PRODCON - 0.08 
(0.91) 
-  - 0.18 
(2.41) 
- 
UNION 
 
- −0.01 
(−0.60) 
-  - −0.01 
(−0.91) 
- 
FOREIGN 
 
- −0.08 
(−0.77) 
-  - −0.06 
(−0.86) 
- 
constant 
 
0.81 
(8.83) 
0.51 
(1.66) 
0.89 
(5.66) 
 0.83 
(12.56) 
0.52 
(2.54) 
0.79 
(6.73) 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.16 0.18 0.14  0.17 0.24 0.11 
Overidentification test - - χ2(5) = 1.99 
(p = 0.85) 
 - - χ2(5) = 7.24 
(p = 0.20) 
No. of observations 187 178 178  186 177 177 
 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 3. First-stage regressions. 
 
 Dependent variable: COLL  Dependent variable: CONC 
lnGROUT 
 
−0.004 
(−0.12) 
 −0.06 
(−3.79) 
ln(K/L) 
 
0.20 
(3.27) 
 0.13 
(4.47) 
ADV 
 
−0.19 
(−1.49) 
 0.08 
(1.78) 
RD 
 
−0.02 
(−0.14) 
 0.10 
(1.74) 
PRODCON −0.11 
(−0.95) 
 −0.04 
(−0.89) 
UNION 
 
0.005 
(1.76) 
 −0.002 
(−1.48) 
FOREIGN 
 
−0.18 
(−2.14) 
 0.27 
(0.72) 
constant 
 
0.08 
(0.24) 
 0.96 
(6.19) 
Sector dummies Yes  Yes 
R2 0.35  0.37 
No. of observations 178  178 
 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4. Robustness checks. 
 
 Dependent variable: RELPROD1 
 OLS OLS 2SLS  OLS 2SLS 
COLL 
 
- - -  −0.16 
(−2.23) 
−0.26 
(−2.01) 
COLL2 
 
−0.15 
(−2.35) 
−0.14 
(−1.96) 
−0.22 
(−1.86) 
 - - 
CONC 
 
0.54 
(4.17) 
0.57 
(3.53) 
0.46 
(1.52) 
 0.60 
(4.08) 
0.70 
(2.84) 
lnGROUT 
 
- 0.03 
(1.25) 
-  0.02 
(0.71) 
- 
ln(K/L) 
 
- −0.01 
(−0.16) 
-  0.03 
(0.60) 
- 
ADV 
 
- 0.02 
(0.20) 
-  - - 
ADV2 
 
- - -  0.07 
(0.56) 
- 
RD 
 
- 0.05 
(0.53) 
-  - - 
RD2 - - -  −0.16 
(−1.76) 
- 
PRODCON - 0.08 
(0.92) 
-  0.12 
(1.25) 
- 
UNION 
 
- −0.01 
(−1.08) 
-  −0.01 
(−0.46) 
- 
FOREIGN 
 
- −0.05 
(−0.46) 
-  −0.10 
(−0.94) 
- 
constant 
 
0.85 
(8.62) 
0.54 
(1.73) 
0.90 
(6.08) 
 0.60 
(1.93) 
0.79 
(6.52) 
sector dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R2 0.14 0.15 0.13  0.19 0.15 
Overidentification test - - χ2(5) = 2.72 
(p = 0.74) 
 - χ2(5) = 5.55 
(p = 0.35) 
No. of observations 192 183 183  171 171 
 
Note: t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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APPENDIX 
 
The most comprehensive source of data on collusion in UK manufacturing in the mid- 
and late 1950s is the Register of Restrictive Trading Agreements created under the 1956 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act. The reports of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission (MRPC) before 1956 and those of the Monopolies Commission (MC) after 
that date also contain detailed information on the operation of cartels in particular 
industries. It is clear from these reports that the industries investigated (some of which 
did not register any agreements under the 1956 Act) had been practicing collusion 
effectively during the 1950s. Other fully reliable sources on the state of competition in 
the 1950s include the MRPC report on collective discrimination (MRPC 1955), and 
several industry studies contained in Burn (1958). Finally, two very important but not 
fully reliable sources are the Board of Trade annual reports from 1949 to 1956 (Board of 
Trade 1949-1952, 1953-1956) and the Political and Economic Planning (1957) survey of 
industrial trade associations, as well as unpublished background material for this survey. 
These two sources provide information on industries alleged to be collusive; most of 
these registered agreements, although some did not. This information must be treated 
with caution because it is mainly based on complaints or reports given by buyers, and 
buyers may wrongly deduce the existence of a price-fixing agreement from price 
uniformity or parallel pricing. On the other hand, it may well be the case that some at 
least of the industries that were alleged to be collusive and did not register any 
agreements were in fact collusive. Thus, there is usually some uncertainty regarding the 
state of competition for products contained in the Board of Trade annual reports or the 
P.E.P. survey but not mentioned as being the subject of restrictive agreements in any of 
the more reliable sources. 
As pointed out in the text, these data sources allow us to distinguish three groups 
of products: a group with explicit restrictive agreements, a group without explicit 
restrictive agreements, and a group with uncertain state of competition in the 1950s. In 
this Appendix I argue that any potential measurement error caused by ineffective 
agreements or unknown cases of collusion in the dataset is likely to be very small. 
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One possible objection is that the data on British cartels relate to explicit 
collusion, but not to tacit collusion. Could it be the case that some of the industries 
classified as non-collusive actually practiced tacit collusion? Although one cannot rule 
out the possibility that firms in an industry colluded tacitly in the absence of any explicit 
arrangement, it is difficult to understand why this would have occurred given that explicit 
collusion was legal and widespread in the 1950s. Furthermore, the 1956 Act required the 
registration of informal and even "implied" understandings as well as formal agreements, 
and this seems to cover cases of tacit collusion. For all the above reasons and given that 
collusive arrangements of all kinds were not enforceable in the courts, the distinction 
between tacit and explicit collusion is not very important in the present context. 
Another possible objection is that some of the agreements may have not been 
effective at the time they were registered, so classifying these industries as collusive 
introduces measurement error. Is this argument valid? I think that it is not, and I will offer 
several different arguments to support this claim.  
First, the case-study evidence discussed in the previous section strongly supports 
the view that the large majority of the agreements had been effective. Second, the 
Register is not the only source of information on collusion in British industry. Several 
industries were investigated by the MRPC during the 1950s, and several more defended 
their agreements before the Restrictive Practices Court. The available information leaves 
no doubt as to the effectiveness of these agreements, which are a significant part of the 
total number. Third, all the sources of information on the effects of the 1956 legislation 
emphasise that competition was slow to emerge in many industries, and that this was 
often due to the fact that information agreements replaced the former price-fixing 
arrangements in the short run. This is not consistent with the view that these 
arrangements were not effective before 1956. Fourth, a weak agreement could not expect 
to gain much from a favourable Court decision, because it would still not be enforceable 
at law. So it is not at all clear why industries with weak agreements would have a strong 
incentive to register. On the contrary, one might argue that it was industries with strong 
agreements that had the strongest incentive to register and try to maintain collusion, 
because of the potentially large cost of a cartel breakdown. Fifth, the evidence from 
Lydall (1958) and Board of Trade (1946) discussed below also suggests that there is no 
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serious measurement error or selection bias in the construction of the collusive group of 
industries in the present study. 
The above discussion suggests that the assumption that the existence of an explicit 
price-fixing agreement is a good overall indicator of collusive conduct is not an 
unreasonable one in the present context. There is, however, one final difficulty, and this 
relates to the issue of non-registration. In particular, non-registration of agreements, if 
widespread, would lead to serious measurement error in the data.  
More precisely, one can distinguish between two possible reasons for non-
registration: firms may simply suspend an agreement or they may switch to secret or tacit 
collusion. Take, first, the former case. A reasonable conjecture in this case is that very 
weak agreements would be more likely to be dropped immediately than stronger ones. 
Even if that were true, we would not be losing much by failing to identify such cases, 
since we are interested in effective agreements, not ineffective ones. But it is not even 
clear why the decision to immediately cancel an agreement rather than register it should 
have occurred in certain types of industries more than in others: there is not much to be 
lost by registering an agreement, even a weak one, when the alternative is cancellation. In 
fact, many of the agreements that were not registered were those that had been 
condemned by the MRPC. Clearly, these were not weak agreements, but the parties must 
have thought that they had practically no chance of success in the Court and wished to 
avoid further adverse publicity. This leaves us with the second reason for non-registration 
mentioned above. One might argue, for instance, that industries where tacit or secret 
collusion would be easier to sustain or less easily detected after 1956 had less of an 
incentive to register. 
An important thing to note with respect to the issue of non-registration is the 
historical context of the introduction of the 1956 Act and, in particular, the uncertainty 
about the way the legislation would be implemented. Because the attitude of the Court 
could not be known until the first cases had been heard, firms were prompted to register 
their restrictive agreements rather than drop or secretly continue them, although in some 
cases they redrafted their agreements or even removed some of the restrictions in an 
attempt to increase the likelihood of a favourable Court decision (see Swann et al. 1974, 
Hunter 1966). It seems therefore that firms genuinely thought that they had a good chance 
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of success in the Court, which also explains why several agreements were defended in the 
Court despite the first few unfavourable Court decisions. An additional factor in 
persuading most industries to register pricing agreements may have been the rather 
ambiguous attitude of the MRPC towards price-fixing (as opposed to other types of 
restrictions, such as collective exclusive dealing or market sharing). In particular, 
between 1948 and 1956 the MRPC investigated restrictive practices in several industries; 
however, only in some of these did it find price-fixing to be unambiguously against the 
public interest. To these arguments one could add that the 1956 Act gave the Registrar 
powers of investigation. Being an officer at the Board of Trade, the Registrar would 
certainly have access to all the complaints made throughout the 1950s by buyers claiming 
the existence of restrictive agreements in particular industries. Thus it would be difficult 
for many industries to collude secretly and go unnoticed for a long time. For all these 
reasons, it seems safe to conclude that non-registration was not a widespread 
phenomenon. 
This conclusion is supported by a comparison of the Register of Restrictive 
Trading Agreements with a list of industries subject to restrictive practices published in 
the 1955 MRPC report on collective discrimination. Swann et al. (1974, pp. 153-154) 
mention that out of 60 industries with restrictive agreements listed in the report, 8 did not 
register their agreements. This is a non-negligible percentage, but it has to be borne in 
mind that in some of these industries the agreements had comprised only the collective 
enforcement of resale price maintenance or collective exclusive dealing, without any 
fixing of common prices or market shares. Many of these would normally not be 
registered, because the 1956 Act contained an outright prohibition of the collective 
enforcement of resale price maintenance. Moreover, collective exclusive dealing had 
been consistently condemned by the MRPC and was therefore dropped by several 
industries prior to registration of their agreements. Once this is taken into account, the 
incidence of non-registration of registrable agreements appears to have been rather low. 
Moreover, and most important, in this paper I do not rely solely on information 
about registered agreements. As pointed out above, several of the sources examined allow 
us to identify industries that either were certainly collusive or were alleged to be 
collusive, and did not register any agreements. Although some of these sources are not 
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perfect, it would really be surprising if there were a significant number of cases that 
escaped all of them. 
Finally, additional evidence suggesting that there should not be any significant 
sample selection bias in the data from ineffective or unregistered agreements comes from 
two other sources. The first is a questionnaire survey of competition in UK 
manufacturing in the 1950s (Lydall 1958). This study, which used a sample of 876 
manufacturing firms from all sectors, did not specifically examine collusion; however, 
some of the information provided suggests that firms that perceived their condition as 
being characterised by "no strong competition" were primarily in industries which had a 
high incidence of explicit collusion, according to my classification, while firms that 
thought that they were facing "strong competition" were chiefly in industries without 
many agreements. The second source is a survey of UK cartels carried out in the mid-
1940s by the Board of Trade (Board of Trade 1946). Although the survey was not fully 
comprehensive, the industries chosen spanned the whole spectrum of manufacturing 
industries, covering capital-good as well as consumer-good industries. Despite this large 
coverage, and the fact that most of the British cartels of the 1950s had already been active 
at the time of the Board of Trade survey (see Swann et al. 1974), there are virtually no 
industries reported as being subject to restrictive agreements in the early 1940s which are 
not mentioned as collusive in at least one of my data sources for collusion in the 1950s. 
Furthermore, nearly all of these industries registered agreements under the 1956 Act. 
 One can conclude, on the basis of the above discussion, that the issue of potential 
non-registration of agreements does not cause any significant measurement error in the 
present data.  
 
